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The Strategic Timing Of Direct Democracy

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  • MARC MEREDITH

Abstract

This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda‐setters in direct democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agenda‐setters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards' use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low‐ and high‐turnout elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Meredith, 2009. "The Strategic Timing Of Direct Democracy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 159-177, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:159-177
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00342.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Rubinfeld & Randall Thomas, 1980. "On the economics of voter turnout in local school elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 315-331, January.
    2. Smith,Alastair, 2004. "Election Timing," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521833639.
    3. Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1977. "Voting in a Local School Election: A Micro Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(1), pages 30-42, February.
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    5. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Randy A. Ehrenberg & Christopher L. Smith & Liang Zhang, 2002. "Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?," NBER Working Papers 9088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:01:p:25-42_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:1:p:25-42_1 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dunne, Stephanie & Reed, W Robert & Wilbanks, James, 1997. "Endogenizing the Median Voter: Public Choice Goes to School," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(1-2), pages 99-118, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Isen, Adam, 2014. "Do local government fiscal spillovers exist? Evidence from counties, municipalities, and school districts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 57-73.
    2. Yoon-Jung Choi, 2022. "Property tax interaction among overlapping local jurisdictions: quasi-experimental evidence from school bond referenda," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(3), pages 537-580, June.
    3. Bich Thi Ngoc Tran, 2021. "Which Townships Support Charter Schools? A Study of the 2016 Massachusetts Charter Referendum," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(2), pages 865-880, March.
    4. Candon Johnson & Joshua Hall, 2019. "The Public Choice of Public Stadium Financing: Evidence from San Diego Referenda," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-9, March.
    5. Garmann, Sebastian, 2016. "Concurrent elections and turnout: Causal estimates from a German quasi-experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 167-178.
    6. Michel Grosz & Ross Milton, 2025. "Relaxing electoral constraints in local education funding," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 1394-1416, September.
    7. Sebastian Garmann, 2020. "Political efficacy and the persistence of turnout shocks," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 411-429, November.
    8. Huan Gong & Cynthia L. Rogers, 2014. "Does Voter Turnout Influence School Bond Elections?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(1), pages 247-262, July.

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