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Election Timing

Author

Listed:
  • Smith,Alastair

Abstract

Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith,Alastair, 2004. "Election Timing," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521833639, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521833639
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    2. Chrétien, Stéphane & Coggins, Frank, 2009. "Election outcomes and financial market returns in Canada," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Marc Meredith, 2009. "The Strategic Timing Of Direct Democracy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 159-177, March.
    4. Nicolas Gavoille & Katharina Hofer, 2021. "Capital Controls and Electoral Cycles," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(2), pages 275-324, June.
    5. Dharma Lesmono & Elliot Tonkes, 2006. "Stochastic Dynamic Programming For Election Timing: A Game Theory Approach," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 23(03), pages 287-309.
    6. Becher, Michael, 2018. "Dissolution Power, Confidence Votes, and Policymaking in Parliamentary Democracies," TSE Working Papers 18-945, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Lesmono, Dharma & Tonkes, Elliot & Burrage, Kevin, 2009. "Opportunistic timing and manipulation in Australian Federal Elections," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 192(2), pages 677-691, January.
    8. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    9. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    10. Becher, Michael, 2018. "Dissolution Power, Confidence Votes, and Policymaking in Parliamentary Democracies," IAST Working Papers 18-80, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).

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