A Case for Quantity Regulation
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Other versions of this item:
- Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Case for Quantity Regulation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1909, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus the Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899.
- Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2002.
"On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation,"
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1997. "On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation," NBER Working Papers 6251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Michael Mandler, 2001.
"Accessible Pareto-Improvements: Using Market Information to Reform Inefficiencies,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
398, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Michael Mandler, 2001. "Accessible Pareto-Improvements: Using Market Information to Reform Inefficiencies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1320, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Ioannis Tokatlidis, 2005. "Dollar Shortages and Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September.
- Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, 2006. "The Church vs the Mall: What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition?," NBER Working Papers 12410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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