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When is Less More? Bank Arrangements for Liquidity vs Central Bank Support

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Listed:
  • Viral V. Acharya
  • Raghuram Rajan
  • Zhi Quan (Bill) Shu

Abstract

Theory suggests that in the face of fire-sale externalities, banks have incentives to overinvest in order to issue cheap money-like deposit liabilities. The existence of a private market for insurance such as contingent capital can eliminate the overinvestment incentives, leading to efficient outcomes. However, it does not eliminate fire sales. A central bank that can infuse liquidity cheaply may be motivated to intervene in the face of fire sales. If so, it can crowd out the private market and, if liquidity intervention is not priced at higher-than-breakeven rates, induce overinvestment once again. We examine various forms of public intervention to identify the least distortionary ones. Our analysis suggests why private contingent capital dominated in the era preceding central banks and deposit insurance, why it waned subsequently, as well as why banking crises and speculative excesses continue to recur periodically.

Suggested Citation

  • Viral V. Acharya & Raghuram Rajan & Zhi Quan (Bill) Shu, 2025. "When is Less More? Bank Arrangements for Liquidity vs Central Bank Support," NBER Working Papers 34099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34099
    Note: CF EFG ME
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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