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When is less more? Bank arrangements for liquidity vs central bank support

Author

Listed:
  • Viral V Acharya
  • Raghuram Rajan
  • Zhi Quan (Bill) Shu

Abstract

Theory suggests that in the face of fire-sale externalities, banks have incentives to overinvest in order to issue cheap money-like deposit liabilities. The existence of a private market for insurance such as contingent capital can eliminate the overinvestment incentives, leading to efficient outcomes. However, it does not eliminate fire sales. A central bank that can infuse liquidity cheaply may be motivated to intervene in the face of fire sales. If so, it can crowd out the private market and, if liquidity intervention is not priced at higher-than-breakeven rates, induce overinvestment once again. We examine various forms of public intervention to identify the least distortionary ones. Our analysis helps understand the historical prevalence of private insurance in the era preceding central banks and deposit insurance, its subsequent disappearance, as well as the continuing incidence of banking crises and speculative excesses.

Suggested Citation

  • Viral V Acharya & Raghuram Rajan & Zhi Quan (Bill) Shu, 2025. "When is less more? Bank arrangements for liquidity vs central bank support," BIS Working Papers 1307, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:1307
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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