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Central Bank Communication with the Polarized Public

Author

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  • Pei Kuang
  • Michael Weber
  • Shihan Xie

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of political polarization on public trust in the Fed and its influence on macroeconomic expectations. Using a large-scale survey experiment which we fielded on President Trump's 2025 inauguration day, we study how households form beliefs about the Fed regarding its political leaning, independence, and trustworthiness. Political alignment significantly shapes perceptions: individuals who view the Fed as politically aligned report higher independence of and trust in the Fed, leading to lower inflation expectations and uncertainty. Strategic communication on institutional structure and policy objectives effectively mitigates perception biases, reinforcing the Fed’s credibility and enhancing its policy effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Pei Kuang & Michael Weber & Shihan Xie, 2025. "Central Bank Communication with the Polarized Public," NBER Working Papers 33524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    2. Coibion, Olivier & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Weber, Michael, 2020. "Political Polarization and Expected Economic Outcomes," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9h51c373, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Carola Conces Binder & Rupal Kamdar & Jane M. Ryngaert, 2024. "Partisan Expectations and COVID-Era Inflation," NBER Chapters, in: Inflation in the COVID Era and Beyond, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Goodhart, C. A. E. & Hoang Vu, Ly, 2025. "When do people trust their government?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127880, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • E70 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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