Donor Governance and Financial Management in Prominent U.S. Art Museums
I study “donor governance,” which occurs when contributors to non-profit firms place restrictions on their gifts to limit the discretion of managers. In a study of U.S. art museums, I find that this practice has grown significantly in recent years, and it represents the largest source of permanent capital in the industry. When donor restrictions are strong, museums shift their cost structures away from administration and toward program services, and they exhibit very high savings rates, retaining in their endowments 45 cents of each incremental dollar donated. Retention rates are near zero for cash generated from other activities. Restricted donations appear to stabilize non-profits and significantly influence their activities, but they reduce management flexibility and may contribute to lower profit margins. Rising donor governance in U.S. art museums may represent a reaction by contributors to the industry’s high rates of financial distress, weak boards of trustees, and large private benefits of control enjoyed by managers.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2015|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeffrey R. Brown & Stephen G. Dimmock & Jun-Koo Kang & Scott J. Weisbenner, 2014.
"How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 931-962, March.
- Jeffrey Brown & Stephen G. Dimmock & Jun-Koo Kang & Scott Weisbenner, 2010. "How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications," NBER Working Papers 15861, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:cbo:report:21198 is not listed on IDEAS
- Brown, Keith C. & Garlappi, Lorenzo & Tiu, Cristian, 2010. "Asset allocation and portfolio performance: Evidence from university endowment funds," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 268-294, May.
- Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Michael S. Weisbach, 2004. "The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1777-1804, August.
- Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
- Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, 2002. "Art as an Investment and the Underperformance of Masterpieces," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1656-1668, December.
- Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar & Jialan Wang, 2008. "Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment Success," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(3), pages 207-222, Summer.
- Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar & Jialan Wang, 2008. "Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment Success," NBER Working Papers 14341, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mensah, Yaw M. & Werner, Robert, 2003. "Cost efficiency and financial flexibility in institutions of higher education," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 293-323.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
- Eldenburg, Leslie & Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Weisbach, Michael S. & Wosinska, Marta, 2004. "Governance, performance objectives and organizational form: evidence from hospitals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 527-548, September.
- Stephen G. Dimmock, 2012. "Background Risk and University Endowment Funds," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 789-799, August.
- Newton, Ashley N., 2015. "Executive compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in the absence of owners," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 195-222.
- Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Economics of Art Thefts: Too Much Screaming over Munch's "The Scream"?," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 28(4), pages 291-303, December.
- Congressional Budget Office, 2010. "Tax Arbitrage by Colleges and Universities," Reports 21198, Congressional Budget Office. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21066. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.