IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/econpa/v28y2009i4p291-303.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Economics of Art Thefts: Too Much Screaming over Munch's The Scream?

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Nicita
  • Matteo Rizzolli

Abstract

The theft of Munch's The Scream in 2004 fired up a debate over museums’ protection policies because of the low level of security and the lack of any insurance against theft. In this paper we provide a rationale for the choices made by the Munch's museum. More generally, we show how diverting expenses in security and insurance to investments over the notoriousness of their collections reinforces the protection of Museums’ properties. This is because of two counter‐intuitive effects: (1) investments in precautions, while reducing thieves’ profits, may adversely attract them towards works of art of higher value; (2) insurance may actually increase the incentive to steal works of art for the purpose of ransom.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2009. "The Economics of Art Thefts: Too Much Screaming over Munch's The Scream?," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 28(4), pages 291-303, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:28:y:2009:i:4:p:291-303
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1759-3441.2010.00045.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-3441.2010.00045.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1759-3441.2010.00045.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heilbrun,James & Gray,Charles M., 2001. "The Economics of Art and Culture," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637121.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Throsby, David, 1994. "The Production and Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-29, March.
    4. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2009. "The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 82-96, July.
    5. Frey, Bruno S. & Meier, Stephan, 2006. "The Economics of Museums," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, in: V.A. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 29, pages 1017-1047, Elsevier.
    6. Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Individual precautions to prevent theft: Private versus socially optimal behavior," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 123-132, September.
    7. repec:bla:jecsur:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:267-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Allen, Douglas W, 2002. "The Rhino's Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an Asset," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 339-358, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
    2. David Yermack, 2017. "Donor governance and financial management in prominent US art museums," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 41(3), pages 215-235, August.
    3. Frederick Chen & Rebecca Regan, 2017. "Arts and craftiness: an economic analysis of art heists," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 41(3), pages 283-307, August.
    4. David Yermack, 2015. "Donor Governance and Financial Management in Prominent U.S. Art Museums," NBER Working Papers 21066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    2. Clements, Matthew T., 2003. "Precautionary incentives for privately informed victims," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 237-251, September.
    3. Eva Vicente & Pablo de Frutos, 2011. "Application of the travel cost method to estimate the economic value of cultural goods: Blockbuster art exhibitions," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 196(1), pages 37-63, january.
    4. Daniel Urrutiaguer, 2011. "Theatre," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 59, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Chiu, W. Henry & Madden, Paul, 1998. "Burglary and income inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 123-141, July.
    6. Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015. "Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
    7. Sacit Akdede & John King, 2006. "Demand for and productivity analysis of Turkish public theater," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 30(3), pages 219-231, December.
    8. Eduardo Hidalgo & Erik Hornung & Pablo Selaya, 2022. "NAFTA and Drug-Related Violence in Mexico," CESifo Working Paper Series 9981, CESifo.
    9. Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77.
    10. Tang, Johnny Jiahao, 2020. "Individual heterogeneity and cultural attitudes in credence goods provision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    11. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 1999. "Gated Communities and the Economic Geography of Crime," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 80-105, July.
    12. Maija Halonen-Aktawijuka & Evanjelos Parfilis, 2022. "Who Should Own the Past?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 22/758, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    13. Marco-Serrano, Francisco & Rausell-Köster, Pau, 2006. "Productivity Analysis in the Spanish Cultural and Leisure Industry: A Regional Perspective/Análisis de la productividad en el sector de la cultura y el ocio español: una perspectiva regional," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 24, pages 635(24á)-63, Agosto.
    14. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2012. "Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 455-459.
    15. José Grisolía & Kenneth Willis, 2012. "A latent class model of theatre demand," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 36(2), pages 113-139, May.
    16. Kristien Werck & Bruno Heyndels, 2007. "Programmatic choices and the demand for theatre: the case of Flemish theatres," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 31(1), pages 25-41, March.
    17. Asuaga, Carolina, 2006. "Los museos. Desde la economía a la Teoría General del Costo [The museums. From economics to the General Cost Theory]," MPRA Paper 105379, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2006.
    18. Kangoh Lee & Santiago M. Pinto, 2009. "Crime In A Multi‐Jurisdictional Model With Private And Public Prevention," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 977-996, December.
    19. Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, 2010. "The Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime," NBER Chapters, in: Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs, pages 331-363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Zimmerman, Paul R., 2010. "Deterrence from self-protection measures in the ‘market model’ of crime: dynamic panel data estimates from employment in private security occupations," MPRA Paper 26187, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:28:y:2009:i:4:p:291-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esausea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.