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International Policy Coordination: The Long View

  • Barry Eichengreen

This paper places current efforts at international economic policy coordination in historical perspective. It argues that successful cooperation is most likely in four sets of circumstances. First, when it centers on technical issues. Second, when cooperation is institutionalized - when procedures and precedents create presumptions about the appropriate conduct of policy and reduce the transactions costs of reaching an agreement. Third, when it is concerned with preserving an existing set of policies and behaviors (when it is concerned with preserving a policy regime). Fourth, when it occurs in the context of broad comity among nations. These points are elaborated through a review of 150 years of historical experience and then used to assess the scope for cooperative responses to the current economic crisis.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17665.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17665.

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Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Publication status: published as International Policy Coordination: The Long View , Barry Eichengreen. in Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century , Feenstra and Taylor. 2014
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17665
Note: DAE IFM
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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  1. Gallarotti, Guilio M., 1995. "The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard 1880-1914," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195089905, March.
  2. Nikolaus Wolf, 2010. "Europe's Great Depression - Coordination Failure after the First World War," CESifo Working Paper Series 3164, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Meissner, Christopher M., 2005. "A new world order: explaining the international diffusion of the gold standard, 1870-1913," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 385-406, July.
  4. Marc Flandreau, 1997. "Central Bank Co-operation in Historical Perspective: a Sceptical View," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/648, Sciences Po.
  5. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521845519 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521792677 is not listed on IDEAS
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