Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement
This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2009|
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