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Political Risk Versus Market Risk in Social Security

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  • John B. Shoven
  • Sita N. Slavov

Abstract

Pay-as-you-go Social Security is typically characterized as a universal defined benefit pension program. Implicit in this characterization is a sense that the participant's investment in future benefits is somehow guaranteed, or safe from risk. This study develops the concept of "political risk" as the possibility that some future legislature will be forced to change the tax and benefit provisions of pay-as-you-go social security programs, when there are changes in the demographic and macroeconomic variables that support it. Thus there is a "political risk" to participants that might be compared to the "market risk" in a personal accounts retirement scheme. In this paper, we carry out a detailed quantitative analysis of political risk in the U.S. Social Security system, as well as an overview of policy reforms in several European countries that demonstrate political risk more broadly across social security systems. For the U.S., we compute the internal rates of return (IRRs) from Social Security for various age groups and income levels, using the existing law in effect each year since 1939. We find considerable variation in IRRs through time for any birth cohort. Participants experienced significant declines in IRRs as a result of adjustments made to restore the system's solvency in 1983 and 1994. If the system were brought into actuarial balance in 2005, younger cohorts would experience another significant decline in their lifetime IRR. Our review of other countries demonstrates political risk in other social security systems as well. Law changes necessitated by actuarial imbalances pass demographic risk on to participants. The debate over personal accounts, therefore, is not one of "safe" versus "risky" benefits, but one of portfolio choice.

Suggested Citation

  • John B. Shoven & Sita N. Slavov, 2006. "Political Risk Versus Market Risk in Social Security," NBER Working Papers 12135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12135
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sita Nataraj & John B. Shoven, 2003. "Comparing the Risks of Social Security with and without Individual Accounts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 348-353, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Willi Semmler, 2011. "Asset Prices, Booms and Recessions," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-642-20680-1, December.
    2. Juraj Kopecsni & Libor Dusek, 2007. "Political Risk of Social Security: Evidence from Reforms in Hungary and the Czech Republic," EcoMod2007 23900044, EcoMod.
    3. Luciano Fanti, 2012. "PAYG pensions and fertility drop: some (pleasant) arithmetic," Discussion Papers 2012/146, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    4. Brown, Jeffrey R. & Weisbenner, Scott J., 2014. "Why do individuals choose defined contribution plans? Evidence from participants in a large public plan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 35-46.
    5. Francisco J. Gomes & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Luis M. Viceira, 2012. "The Excess Burden of Government Indecision," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 125-164.
    6. Mauro Visaggio, 2019. "Extending the retirement age for preserving the costitutive pension system mission," Public Finance Research Papers 40, Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DSGE, Sapienza University of Rome.
    7. Rudolph, Alexandra & Priebe, Jan, 2015. "Pension programs around the world: determinants of social pension," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112986, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Andrew A. Samwick, 2018. "The Welfare Cost of Perceived Policy Uncertainty: Evidence from Social Security," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(2), pages 275-307, February.
    9. Sita Slavov & Devon Gorry & Aspen Gorry & Frank N. Caliendo, 2019. "Social Security and Saving: An Update," Public Finance Review, , vol. 47(2), pages 312-348, March.
    10. Brown, Jeffrey R. & Ivković, Zoran & Weisbenner, Scott, 2015. "Empirical determinants of intertemporal choice," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 473-486.
    11. Timothy Smeeding & Eva Sierminska & Andrea Brandolini, 2006. "Cross National Comparison of Income and Wealth Status in Retirement: First Results from the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS)," LWS Working papers 2, LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg.
    12. Libor Dusek, 2007. "Political Risk of Social Security: The Case of the Indexation of Benefits in the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp318, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    13. Bossi, Luca, 2008. "Intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 2240-2268, July.
    14. Andrew Coleman, 2014. "To Save or Save Not: Intergenerational Neutrality and the Expansion of New Zealand Superannuation," Treasury Working Paper Series 14/02, New Zealand Treasury.
    15. Alfonso R. Sánchez Martín, 2019. "Normativa de cotización y pensiones de trabajadores autónomos en España: ¿Se incentiva al ahorro de ciclo vital?," Studies on the Spanish Economy eee2019-18, FEDEA.
    16. David Blake, 2008. "What is a Promise from the Government Worth? Quantifying Political Risk in State and Personal Pension Schemes in the United Kingdom," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(298), pages 342-361, May.

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