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The Changing Role of Auditors in Corporate Tax Planning

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  • Edward L. Maydew
  • Douglas A. Shackelford

Abstract

This paper examines changes in the role that auditors play in corporate tax planning following recent events, including the well-known accounting scandals, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and regulatory actions by the SEC and PCAOB. On the whole, these events have increased the sensitivity to and scrutiny of auditor independence. We examine the effects of these events on the market for tax planning, in particular the longstanding link between audit and tax services. While the effects are recent, they are already being seen in the data. Specifically, there has already been a dramatic shift in the market for tax planning away from obtaining tax planning services from one's auditor. We estimate that the ratio of tax fees to audit fees paid to the auditors of firms in the S&P 500 decline from approximately one in 2001 to one-fourth in 2004. At the same time, we find no evidence of a general decline in spending for tax services. In sum, the evidence indicates a decoupling of the longstanding link between audit and tax services, such that firms are shifting their purchase of tax services away from their auditor and towards other providers.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward L. Maydew & Douglas A. Shackelford, 2005. "The Changing Role of Auditors in Corporate Tax Planning," NBER Working Papers 11504, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11504
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dyreng, Scott D. & Hanlon, Michelle & Maydew, Edward L. & Thornock, Jacob R., 2017. "Changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 441-463.
    2. Ru-Je Lee & Hui-Sung Kao, 2018. "The Impacts of IFRSs and Auditor on Tax Avoidance," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 8(6), pages 1-2.
    3. Albring, Susan & Robinson, Dahlia & Robinson, Michael, 2014. "Audit committee financial expertise, corporate governance, and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 81-94.
    4. Taylor, Grantley & Richardson, Grant, 2014. "Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting: Empirical evidence from Australia," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15.
    5. Huseynov, Fariz & Klamm, Bonnie K., 2012. "Tax avoidance, tax management and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 804-827.
    6. Jones, Chris & Temouri, Yama & Cobham, Alex, 2018. "Tax haven networks and the role of the Big 4 accountancy firms," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 177-193.
    7. Jean Bédard & Suzanne M. Paquette, 2021. "Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Litigation Risk, and Auditor‐Provided Tax Services†," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(1), pages 7-48, March.
    8. Heltzer, Wendy & Mindak, Mary P. & Shelton, Sandra W., 2012. "The relation between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting: Evidence from ex-Arthur Andersen clients," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 96-104.
    9. Soufiene Assidi & Khaled Hussainey, 2021. "The effect of tax preparers on corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence form the UK context," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 2279-2288, April.
    10. Dina Nurpeissova & Lyazzat Beisenova & Aliya Shakharova & Kuralay Balginova & Bayan Abzhalova, 2024. "Desk Audit in the State Audit System," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 183-194.
    11. Epps, Kathryn K. & Catherine Cleaveland, M., 2009. "Insiders’ perspectives of the effects of recent regulation on corporate taxation," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 34-47.
    12. Leung, Sidney C.M. & Richardson, Grant & Taylor, Grantley, 2019. "The effect of the general anti-avoidance rule on corporate tax avoidance in China," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 105-117.
    13. Thompson, Dave & Booker, Quinton, 2015. "Bank loan officers' perceptions concerning independence, objectivity, and reliability when external auditors also perform tax compliance activities for nonpublic clients," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 14-20.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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