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The Joint Determination of Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees, and Abnormal Accruals

Author

Listed:
  • Rick Antle

    () (Yale University, School of Management)

  • Elizabeth A. Gordon

    () (Accounting)

  • Ganapathi Narayanamoorthy

    () (School of Management)

  • Ling Zhou

    () (School of Management)

Abstract

Prior research has estimated piecemeal the determinants of audit fees, non-audit services fees and abnormal accruals. Intuition, informal analysis, and a variety of theories of various aspects of auditor-client interaction suggest that audit fees, nonaudit fees, and abnormal accruals are jointly determined. We address this endogeneity issue by modeling the confluence of audit fees, fees for non-audit services and abnormal accruals in a system of simultaneous equations. Using audit and non-audit fee data from the U.K. for 1994-2000, we find evidence consistent with knowledge spillovers (or economies of scope) from auditing to non-audit services and from non-audit services to auditing. While knowledge spillovers from non-audit services to auditing is a known result [e.g. see Simunic (1984)] the presence of knowledge spillovers from auditing to non-audit services is a new result. Contrary to recent results in Ferguson et al. (2001) and Frankel et al. (2002), we do not find support for the assertion that fees for non-audit services increase abnormal accruals. In fact, we find that nonaudit fees decrease abnormal accruals. We also find evidence that audit fees increase abnormal accruals. Finally, our evidence is not consistent with audit firms playing pricing games, bribery or the demand and supply effects of abnormal accruals. The findings are robust to preliminary tests with U.S. data.

Suggested Citation

  • Rick Antle & Elizabeth A. Gordon & Ganapathi Narayanamoorthy & Ling Zhou, 2002. "The Joint Determination of Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees, and Abnormal Accruals," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm289, Yale School of Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bartley R. Danielsen & Robert A. Van Ness & Richard S. Warr, 2007. "Auditor Fees, Market Microstructure, and Firm Transparency," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1-2), pages 202-221.
    2. David Hay & Robert Knechel & Vivian Li, 2006. "Non-audit Services and Auditor Independence: New Zealand Evidence," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(5-6), pages 715-734.
    3. Joel S. Demski, 2003. "Corporate Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 51-72, Spring.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auditing; Auditor Independence; Earnings Management; Abnormal Accruals; Economies of Scope; Endogeneity;

    JEL classification:

    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M49 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Other
    • C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General

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