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Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem

Author

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  • Rohan DUTTA

Abstract

The no-information case of a finite horizon joint search problem between two players with conflicting preferences is studied. It is shown that if the players have convex preferences and are patient enough, then they abandon their search by accepting the first period alternative.

Suggested Citation

  • Rohan DUTTA, 2016. "Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem," Cahiers de recherche 12-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2016
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steve Alpern & Shmuel Gal, 2009. "Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 377-394, November.
    2. Albrecht, James & Anderson, Axel & Vroman, Susan, 2010. "Search by committee," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1386-1407, July.
    3. Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon, 2010. "A sequential selection game with vetoes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-14, January.
    4. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 189-221, April.
    5. Minoru Sakaguchi & Vladimir V. Mazalov, 2004. "A non-zero-sum no-information best-choice game," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 60(3), pages 437-451, December.
    6. Fouad Abdelaziz & Saoussen Krichen, 2007. "Optimal stopping problems by two or more decision makers: a survey," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 89-111, April.
    7. repec:spr:compst:v:60:y:2004:i:3:p:437-451 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    search; bargaining; committees; secretary problem;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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