Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem
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References listed on IDEAS
- Steve Alpern & Shmuel Gal, 2009. "Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 377-394, November.
- Albrecht, James & Anderson, Axel & Vroman, Susan, 2010.
"Search by committee,"
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- Susan Vroman & Axel Anderson & James Albrecht, 2007. "Search by Committee," 2007 Meeting Papers 351, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- James Albrecht & Axel Anderson & Susan Vroman, 2007. "Search by Committee," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Albrecht, James & Anderson, Axel Z. & Vroman, Susan, 2007. "Search by Committee," IZA Discussion Papers 3137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon, 2010. "A sequential selection game with vetoes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-14, January.
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"Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective,"
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- repec:spr:compst:v:60:y:2004:i:3:p:437-451 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordssearch; bargaining; committees; secretary problem;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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