Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
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