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Blame-Games, the Media and Discretionary Behaviour of Bureaucrats

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  • Paul A. Raschky

Abstract

This paper investigates the negative effect of media reports on the provision of public goods by bureaucratic agencies. I provide a simple career concerns model where negative publicity in the media can affect the bureaucrat's future wage. The proposition of the model is tested using data of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' spending on flood protection from 1968-2008.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul A. Raschky, 2010. "Blame-Games, the Media and Discretionary Behaviour of Bureaucrats," Monash Economics Working Papers 07-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2010-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451.
    2. Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson, 2006. "Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 55-73, April.
    3. Svensson, Jakob & Shi, Min, 2002. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 3352, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    4. William Shughart, 2006. "Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 31-53, April.
    5. David Strömberg, 2004. "Radio's Impact on Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 189-221.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 2008. "Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 426-447, April.
    7. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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