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Models With Two Or More Public Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Cornes
  • Juni-ichi Itaya

Abstract

We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilities that arise in this setting. We show that, when there are many public goods, voluntary contribution equilibrium typically generates, not only too low a level of public good provision, but also the wrong mix of public goods. We also analyse the neutrality property in the more general setting, and extend a neutrality proposition of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). The first author would like to thank Professor Peter Bardsley and the Economic Theory Centre, University of Melbourne, for providing a very congenial period as a visitor, during which this paper was completed.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cornes & Juni-ichi Itaya, 2004. "Models With Two Or More Public Goods," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 896, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:896
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    File URL: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/downloads/wpapers-04/896.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. C. Cornes & A. G. Schweinberger, 1996. "Free Riding and the Inefficiency of the Private Production of Pure Public Goods," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 70-91, February.
    2. Kemp, Murray C., 1984. "A note of the theory of international transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(2-3), pages 259-262.
    3. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    4. repec:bla:econom:v:52:y:1985:i:205:p:103-16 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kanbur, S. M. R. & Myles, G. D., 1992. "Policy choice and political constraints," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-29, February.
    6. Campbell, Donald E. & Truchon, Michel, 1988. "Boundary optima and the theory of public goods supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 241-249, March.
    7. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Ihori & Martin McGuireb, 2008. "National Adversity: Managing Insurance and Protection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-554, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-Francois, 2007. "Commitment and matching contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1664-1683, September.
    3. repec:fal:wpaper:05005 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Tilak Sanyal & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2019. "On General and Specific Transfers for Child Support in Divorce," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 17(1), pages 197-213, March.
    5. Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2006. "Private provision of public goods: incentives for donations," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 33(6), pages 497-519, November.
    6. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
    7. Rob Moir, 2004. "Lotteries as a funding tool for financing public goods," CEEL Working Papers 0401, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    8. Anil Markandya & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2012. "Impure public technologies and environmental policy," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(2), pages 128-143, May.
    9. Kung, Fan-chin, 2008. "Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1364-1378, December.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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