Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size
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- Kei Kawakami, 2017. "Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 303-323, November.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsAsymmetric information; Imperfect competition; Information aggregation; Market fragmentation; Network externality puzzle.;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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