IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mlb/wpaper/1189.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size

Author

Listed:
  • Kei Kawakami

    () (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne)

Abstract

This paper studies a risk-sharing model where traders face endowment shocks and information asymmetries. We show that a negative participation externality arises due to the endogenous information aggregation by prices, and it creates a counter force to a standard positive externality of risk-sharing. As a result, the optimal market size that maximizes gains from trade per trader is ?nite. The model indicates that a collection of small markets can be a constrained e¢ cient market structure. We also study a decentralized process of market formation, and show that multiple markets can survive because of the negative informational externality among traders.

Suggested Citation

  • Kei Kawakami, 2015. "Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1189, The University of Melbourne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1189
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1427416/1189KeiKawakamiOptMktSize.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cantillon, Estelle & Yin, Pai-Ling, 2011. "Competition between exchanges: A research agenda," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 329-336, May.
    2. Biais, Bruno & Glosten, Larry & Spatt, Chester, 2005. "Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 217-264, May.
    3. William O. Brown & J. Harold Mulherin & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2008. "Competing with the New York Stock Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1679-1719.
    4. Madhavan, Ananth, 1992. " Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 607-641, June.
    5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    6. Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
    7. Marco Pagano, 1989. "Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 255-274.
    8. Madhavan, Ananth, 2000. "Market microstructure: A survey," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 205-258, August.
    9. José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 2000. "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 563-579.
    10. Spiegel, Matthew & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive Securities Market," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 307-329.
    11. Diamond, Douglas W. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1981. "Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 221-235, September.
    12. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
    13. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Imperfect competition; Information aggregation; Market fragmentation; Network externality puzzle.;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1189. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dandapani Lokanathan). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/demelau.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.