Information, market power and welfare
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Lou, Youcheng & Yang, Yaqing, 2023. "Information linkages in a financial market with imperfect competition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
- Ji, Yucheng & Xu, Weijun & Zhao, Qi & Jia, Zecheng, 2023. "ESG disclosure and investor welfare under asymmetric information and imperfect competition," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
- Zhou, Xuan & Kang, Junqing, 2023. "Searching for ESG Information: Heterogeneous Preferences and Information Acquisition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
double auction; interdependent values; market power; adverse selection; information acquisition; welfare;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2023-06-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2023-06-19 (Microeconomics)
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