Competitive advantage and collusion
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|Date of creation:||1985|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Iwata, Gyoichi, 1974. "Measurement of Conjectural Variations in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(5), pages 947-966, September.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, April.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983.
"Profit-sharing in a collusive industry,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 59-74, June.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Working Papers 83-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 668, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Osborne, Dale K, 1976. "Cartel Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 835-844, December.
- Clarke, Roger & Davies, Stephen W, 1982. "Market Structure and Price-Cost Margins," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 49(195), pages 277-287, August.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1985. "Do Markets Differ Much?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 341-351, June.
- Schmalensee, Richard., 1984. "Do markets differ much?," Working papers 1531-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
- Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
- David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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