Profit-sharing in a collusive industry
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Other versions of this item:
- Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 668, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Working Papers 83-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
References listed on IDEAS
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
- Osborne, Dale K, 1976. "Cartel Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 835-844, December.
- Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 429-472, December.
- Schmalensee, R., 1985. "Competitive advantage and collusion," CORE Discussion Papers 1985043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Aitor Ciarreta & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2012. "Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(3), pages 195-219, July.
- Macleod, W. Bentley, 1985.
"A theory of conscious parallelism,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 25-44, February.
- Macleod, W.B., 1984. "A theory of conscious parallelism," CORE Discussion Papers 1984040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Macleod, W. Bentley, 1985. "A theory of conscious parallelism," CORE Discussion Papers RP 629, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:ags:jaecon:37516 is not listed on IDEAS
- Saglam, Ismail, 2018. "Bargaining over Collusion Profits under Cost Asymmetry and Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 84007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ma, Tay-Cheng, 2008. "Disadvantageous collusion and government regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 168-185, January.
- Tay-Cheng Ma, 2005. "Strategic investment and excess capacity: A study of the Taiwanese flour industry," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 8, pages 153-170, May.
More about this item
- C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
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