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Disadvantageous collusion and government regulation

  • Ma, Tay-Cheng
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-7187(06)00142-1
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 168-185

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:1:p:168-185
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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    1. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    2. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August.
    3. Fershtman, Chaim & Gandal, Neil, 1994. "Disadvantageous semicollusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 141-154, June.
    4. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
    5. Corts, Kenneth S., 1998. "Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 227-250, November.
    6. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 1998. "Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 355-377, Summer.
    7. Shannon K. Mitchell, 1993. "The Welfare Effects of Rent-Saving and Rent-Seeking," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 660-69, August.
    8. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry," Working Papers 83-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    9. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April.
    10. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Robin C. Sickles, 1997. "Capacity and Product Market Competition: Measuring Market Power in a "Puppy-Dog" Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-31, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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