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Interactive Multiple‐Criteria Methods for Reaching Pareto Optimal Agreements in Negotiations

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  • Harri Ehtamo

    (Helsinki University of Technology)

  • Raimo P. Hämäläinen

    (Helsinki University of Technology)

Abstract

The common features of two interactive methods that can be used in multiple-party negotiations over continuous issues are studied. One method is based on finding jointly improving directions to the parties to move along and the other on making constraint proposals to the parties. The history and the related literature on the subject is briefly surveyed in order to position the methods within the field. The basic similarities and differences together with the possibility to use them jointly are studied from the point of view of single negotiation text concept. Potential application areas including facilitation agents in distributed artificial intelligence are suggested.

Suggested Citation

  • Harri Ehtamo & Raimo P. Hämäläinen, 2001. "Interactive Multiple‐Criteria Methods for Reaching Pareto Optimal Agreements in Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(6), pages 475-491, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1012297813663
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1012297813663
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    2. Homberger, Jörg & Fink, Andreas, 2017. "Generic negotiation mechanisms with side payments – Design, analysis and application for decentralized resource-constrained multi-project scheduling problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(3), pages 1001-1012.
    3. An Pan & Tsan-Ming Choi, 2016. "An agent-based negotiation model on price and delivery date in a fashion supply chain," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 242(2), pages 529-557, July.
    4. Siva Sankaran & Tung Bui, 2008. "An organizational model for transitional negotiations: concepts, design and applications," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-173, March.

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