Employment, Technology and Institutions in the Process of Structural Change. A History of Economic Thought Perspective
The present issue of the Working Papers series of the Dipartimento di Economia Politica at Milano- Bicocca reproduces the contributions presented at the mid-year ESHET Conference which took place at the Universities of Pavia and Milano-Bicocca on 16 and 17 November 2001. The program was arranged jointly by Gianni Vaggi and Pier Luigi Porta and the Conference was jointly organised by ESHET with the Department of Political Economy and Quantitative Methods of the University of Pavia and the Department of Political Economy of the University of Milano-Bicocca. The idea around which the Conference was built referred basically to Luigi Pasinetti’s conception of structural change and structural dynamics in a history-of-thought perspective. Luigi Pasinetti, Eshet’s first President, opened the Conference at the University of Pavia. The program included two sessions taking half a day each: the opening session was in Pavia on 16 November 2001 and the final session in Milan the 17 November. Luigi Pasinetti chaired the session held at the University of Pavia and Andrew Skinner was the chairman in Milan.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2002|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2002|
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