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Perspektiven einer Asiatischen Währungsunion

Author

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  • Bernd Hayo

    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Abstract

Die Wahl eines angemessenen Wechselkursregimes ist gerade in Zeiten einer zunehmenden Integration der Weltwirtschaft von großer Bedeutung. Die Theorie der „Unholy Trinity“ postuliert, dass man unter der Restriktion eines freien Kapitalverkehrs nur die Wahl hat zwischen flexiblen Wechselkursen und unabhängiger Geldpolitik und festen Wechselkursen und abhängiger Geldpolitik. Empirisch ist im letzten Jahrzehnt eine gewisse Tendenz zu einem der beiden reinen Wechselkursregime feststellbar, während Mischformen nicht mehr so oft gewählt wurden (Eichengreen, 1994). Entweder optieren Staaten für eine weitgehende Flexibilisierung des Wechselkurses oder sie wählen eine besonders feste Bindung (Währungsunion, Currency Board). Die tatsächlichen Wechselkurssysteme weichen aber teilweise erheblich von den in offiziellen Verlautbarungen genannten ab (Reinhard und Rogoff, 2004). In Asien bestehen typischerweise zwei Arten von Wechselkurssystemen: Entweder (weitgehend) flexible Wechselkurse, z.B. in Japan, oder einseitige Wechselkurs- Anbindungen. So hatte China bis vor kurzem einen einseitig festgelegten Wechselkurs des Renminbi mit dem US Dollar. Am 21. Juli 2005 gab die Chinesische Zentralbank bekannt, dass sich das Wechselkurssystem ändert (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005). Neben einer geringfügigen Aufwertung gegenüber dem US Dollar wurde beschlossen, dass der Renminbi sich im Rahmen eines „managed floating“ an einem Korb von Währungen (u.a. US Dollar, Euro, Yen, Won) orientiert, dessen genaue Gewichte geheim gehalten werden. Ist die feste Wechselkursanbindung eine sinnvolle Strategie? Allgemein kann gezeigt werden, dass diejenigen fixen Wechselkurssysteme, die langfristig Bestand haben, durch eine relativ niedrige Inflationsentwicklung gekennzeichnet sind (Levy-Yeyati und Sturzenegger, 2001). Die asiatische Finanzkrise von 1997 hat unter anderem gezeigt, dass sich diese Art der festen Wechselkursanbindung als problematisch erweisen kann. Beispielsweise hat das starre Festhalten Koreas an seinem einseitig festgelegten Wechselkurs mit dem US Dollar dazu geführt, immens hohe Währungsreserven zu verschwenden und damit die Krise unnötig zu vertiefen (Radelet und Sachs, 1998).

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Hayo, 2005. "Perspektiven einer Asiatischen Währungsunion," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200508, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:2000508
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    File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2005-08_hayo.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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