Optimal Incentives for Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry
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Other versions of this item:
- Böhme, Enrico & Frank, Severin & Kerber, Wolfgang, 2016. "Optimal Incentives for Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145637, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 2005. "Probabilistic Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 75-98, Spring.
- Shapiro, Carl, 2003.
" Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements,"
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- Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements," Law and Economics 0303004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gratz, Linda, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Pay-for-delay Settlements and Their Legal Ruling," Discussion Papers in Economics 12734, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, 2007. "Generic competition and market exclusivity periods in pharmaceuticals," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4-5), pages 491-502.
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- David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, 2009. "Licensing weak patents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00415747, HAL.
- ENCAOUA, David & LEFOUILI, Yassine, 2009. "Licensing 'weak' patents," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2159, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
More about this item
Keywordspatent settlements; collusion; patent challenges;
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2017-01-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HEA-2017-01-15 (Health Economics)
- NEP-INO-2017-01-15 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2017-01-15 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2017-01-15 (Law & Economics)
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