Do Political Institutions Affect the Choice of the U.S. Cross-Listing Venue?
We study the impact of political institutions on foreign firms’ choice of their U.S. cross-listing venue. Using two measures of political institutions (an index of political rights and a political constraint index) and controlling for various firm-level and country-level characteristics, we show that foreign firms from countries with weak political institutions are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. via the over-the-counter market and less likely to opt for an exchange-listed program (i.e., New York, Nasdaq, and AMEX).
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