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Desperately Seeking Small Worlds in Corporate Boards:International Evidence from Listed Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Malika Hamadi

    (CRENoS, University of Sassari)

  • Andreas Heinen

    (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Nicolas Jonard

    (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

  • Alfonso Valdesogo

    (Department of Economics, Universidade Federal Fluminense)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the structure of national corporate board networks of listed firms in a large cross-section of countries. We introduce an explicitly bivariate nonparametric hypothesis test for small worlds, based on the comparison of observed distance and clustering with simulated measures obtained from a number of increasingly stringent bipartite counterfactuals. Using our test, we find little support for the small world hypothesis regardless of the counterfactual. Moreover, we show that results are sensitive to the choice of counterfactual. We further identify the role played by bicliques, small densely connected subsets of the network, in the rejection of the small world hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Malika Hamadi & Andreas Heinen & Nicolas Jonard & Alfonso Valdesogo, 2015. "Desperately Seeking Small Worlds in Corporate Boards:International Evidence from Listed Firms," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-19, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:15-19
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10993/24030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Boards of directors; small worlds; bipartite graphs; testing; bicliques;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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