Can Euroland Survive?
Social unrest across Europe is growing as Euroland's economy collapses faster than the United States', the result of falling exports and a weaker fiscal response. The controversial title of this brief is based on a belief that the nature of the euro itself limits Euroland's fiscal policy space. The nations that have adopted the euro face "market-imposed" fiscal constraints on borrowing because they are not sovereign countries. Research Associate Stephanie A. Kelton and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray foresee a real danger that these nations will be unable to prevent an accelerating slide toward depression that will threaten the existence of the European Union.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Mark M. Spiegel, 1997. "Fiscal constraints in the EMU," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue aug15.
- Philip Arestis & Mosahid Khan & Kul B. Luintel, 2002. "Fiscal Deficits in Monetary Unions: A Comparison of EMU and United States," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(1), pages 89-103, Winter.
- Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995.
"Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
- L. Randall Wray, 1998.
- C. Sardoni & L.R. Wray, 2006. "Monetary policy strategies of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve bank of the United States," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 28(3), pages 451-472, April.
- Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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