IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lam/wpaper/14-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do malevolent leaders provoke conflict? An experiment on the paradox of the plenty

Author

Listed:
  • Klarizze Puzon
  • Marc Willinger

Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group fighting, i.e. the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the role of leader behavior in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and leadership. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when resource size is higher. It is only when leaders are benevolent, i.e. they chose the strongest resource protection in the first stage, that group conflict (in come) is reduced (goes up). When leaders are malevolent, i.e. they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than those under anarchy.

Suggested Citation

  • Klarizze Puzon & Marc Willinger, 2014. "Do malevolent leaders provoke conflict? An experiment on the paradox of the plenty," Working Papers 14-10, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2014-10.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2014
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994. "North-South Trade and the Global Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 851-874, September.
    2. Erik O Kimbrough & Roman M Sheremeta, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," Working Papers 14-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    3. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Poelhekke, Steven, 2010. "The pungent smell of "red herrings": Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 44-55, July.
    4. Klarizze Anne Puzon & Marc Willinger, 2014. "WHY MY PARTICIPATION MATTERS: Rent-seeking with endogenous prize determination," Working Papers 14-05, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2014.
    5. Hodler, Roland, 2006. "The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1367-1386, August.
    6. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L, 1998. "Do the Rich Get Richer and the Poor Poorer? Experimental Tests of a Model of Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 970-983, September.
    7. Kocher, Martin G. & Martinsson, Peter & Visser, Martine, 2008. "Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 508-511, June.
    8. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2006. "Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 457-476, September.
    9. Duffy, John & Kim, Minseong, 2005. "Anarchy in the laboratory (and the role of the state)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 297-329, March.
    10. Erik O Kimbrough & Roman M Sheremeta, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 51(4), pages 487-500, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/lamplfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.