Do malevolent leaders provoke conflict? An experiment on the paradox of the plenty
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More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-06 (Game Theory)
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