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Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

  • Bonein Aurélie
  • Serra Daniel

This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictatorultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less otherregarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.

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File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2007-04.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 07-04.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision: Apr 2007
Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:07-04
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