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Strategic Determination of Renegotiation Costs


  • Akitoshi Muramoto

    (Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University)


Recently, some literature on incomplete contracts studies the cases where renegotiations take place inefficiently. We extend the incomplete contract model in Hart (2009) by assuming that one party chooses an action which affects renegotiation costs. In our model, renegotiation costs are determined endogenously. We characterize the condition that she can get higher payoff by manipulating renegotiation costs than when she cannot manipulate renegotiation costs and renegotiations take place efficiently. Whereas she chooses positive renegotiation costs, renegotiations never occur on the equilibrium paths. They work just as "credible threat". Her equilibrium share ratio of the ex ante bargaining surplus is higher than her bargaining power. As an application, we discuss an investment problem by using a variant of our basic model. We show that the agents mitigate the investment problem by setting some positive renegotiation costs and increasing a high skilled agent's share ratio of the ex ante bargaining surplus to give her larger incentive of investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Akitoshi Muramoto, 2013. "Strategic Determination of Renegotiation Costs," KIER Working Papers 877, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:877

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    5. Oliver Hart, 2009. "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(1), pages 267-300.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Akitoshi Muramoto, 2016. "Complementarity and inefficient renegotiation: an incomplete contract approach," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(2), pages 721-728.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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