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Workfare as "Collateral": The case of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India

Author

Listed:
  • Subhasish Dey

    (Economics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK)

  • Katsushi S. Imai

    (School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester (UK) and RIEB, Kobe University (Japan))

Abstract

This paper argues that a major beneficial impact of workfare programs is through their role in allowing participants to improve their access to “credit”. Sustained program participation serves as “collateral” for households’ acquisition of informal credit, leading to the improvement in economic security and poverty reduction. Using a three-round household panel dataset in India in 2009-2012, we produce robust evidence that continuous participation in NREGS facilitates credit acquisition, increases income and consumption, and reduces consumption variability. A conceptual framework using an infinitely repeated trilateral stage game among lender, workfare participant, and local politician is developed to support our empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhasish Dey & Katsushi S. Imai, 2014. "Workfare as "Collateral": The case of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India," Discussion Paper Series DP2014-27, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Mar 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2014-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Clive Bell & Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, 2020. "Income Guarantees and Borrowing in Risky Environments: Evidence from India's Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 87(347), pages 763-812, July.
    2. Pajaron, Marjorie & Latinazo, Cara T. & Trinidad, Enrico G., 2020. "The children are alright: Revisiting the impact of parental migration in the Philippines," GLO Discussion Paper Series 507, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2016. "Local Institutional Structure and Clientelistic Access to Employment: The Case of MGNREGS in Three States of India," Working Papers id:11549, eSocialSciences.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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