Tariffs And Trade Liberalization With Network Externalities
This paper constructs a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade in network goods to consider the implications of network externalities for an optimal tari policy and the welfare e ects of bilateral tari reductions. We show that the degree of network externalities nontrivially a ects the sign of the Nash equilibrium tari . Then, we prove that network externalities amplify the gains from tari reductions. These results help better understand the implications of traderelated issues in network industries.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Date of revision:||May 2011|
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Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
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- Portugal-Perez, Alberto & Reyes, Jose-Daniel & Wilson, John S., 2009.
"Beyond the information technology agreement : harmonization of standards and trade in electronics,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4916, The World Bank.
- Alberto Portugal‐Perez & José‐Daniel Reyes & John S. Wilson, 2010. "Beyond the Information Technology Agreement: Harmonisation of Standards and Trade in Electronics," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(12), pages 1870-1897, December.
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