Incentives, Identity, and Organizational Forms
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Hideshi Itoh, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 18-45.
- Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-254, April.
- Kohei Daido, 2006. "Peer Pressure and Incentives," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 51-60, January.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
- Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen, 2012. "Social norms and economic incentives in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 173-185.
- Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
- Robert Gibbons, 2005. "What is Economic Sociology and Should any Economists Care?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 3-7, Winter.
- Kohei Daido, 2004. "Risk-averse agents with peer pressure," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 383-386.
More about this item
KeywordsPrincipal-agent Model; Multiagents; Moral Hazard; Reference Group; Peer Pressure; Identity; Proliferation of Job Titles.;
- B49 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-08-02 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CBE-2009-08-02 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-08-02 (Contract Theory & Applications)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dekgujp.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.