IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kgu/wpaper/27.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Cross-Licensing System Discourages R&D Investments In Completely Complementary Technologies

Author

Listed:
  • Makoto Okamura

    (Hiroshima University)

  • Testuya Shinkai

    () (Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Satoru Tanaka

    (Kobe City University of Foreign Studies)

Abstract

We consider the research and development (R&D) investment com petition of duopolistic firms in completely complementary technologies. By "completely complementary technologies," we mean that no firm can produce the goods without both of the technologies. We derive the investments competition equilibria in R&D of the two completely complementary technologies with and without a cross-licensing system. By comparing R&D investment levels in the two equilibria, we show that the cross-licensing system discourages the R&D invest ments when the duopolistic firms produce goods by using the two completely complementary technologies.

Suggested Citation

  • Makoto Okamura & Testuya Shinkai & Satoru Tanaka, 2005. "A Cross-Licensing System Discourages R&D Investments In Completely Complementary Technologies," Discussion Paper Series 27, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Sep 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp27.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2005
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring.
    2. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    4. Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 34-57, Spring.
    5. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Testuya Shinkai & Satoru Tanaka & Makoto Okamura, 2005. "Licensing and R&D Investment of Duopolistic Firms with Partially Complementary Technologies," Discussion Paper Series 25, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Mar 2005.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    completely complementary technologies; cross-licensing system; R&D investments;

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dekgujp.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.