Using patents to mislead rivals
Firms claim they do not rely heavily on patents. Yet they patent, as indicated by the large number of patents that are granted. This paper offers a possible resolution to this puzzle. It takes a simplified version of a duopoly innovation race and studies the patenting decision of an innovator who has private information about the improvability of her innovation. It is shown that a firm may use the patenting decision to mislead her rival. Under symmetric information, research can be stimulated but not disclosed. However, under asymmetric information, disclosure is more likely, even though research incentive may be weakened.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4|
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, 1998.
"Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent,"
Annals of Economics and Statistics,
GENES, issue 49-50, pages 265-288.
- Crampes, C. & Langinier, C., 1996. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Papers 96.429, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2000. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Staff General Research Papers 10461, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
- Takalo, Tuomas & Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000. "Do patents slow down technological progress?: Real options in research, patenting, and market introduction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1105-1127, October.
- Choi, Jay Pil, 1996.
"Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard,"
22, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003.
"Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not),"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000624, David K. Levine.
- Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
- Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2002.
"Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases,"
Staff General Research Papers
5231, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, 2002. "Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 258-274, Summer.
- O'DONOGHUE, Ted & SCOTCHMER, Suzanne & THISSE, Jacques-François, .
"Patent breadth, patent life, and the pace of technological progress,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1314, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ted O'Donoghue & Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, 1998. "Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, 03.
- Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, 1996. "Licensing vs. Litigation: Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate," Industrial Organization 9612002, EconWPA.
- Ariel Pakes, 1984.
"Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks,"
NBER Working Papers
1340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pakes, Ariel S, 1986. "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 755-84, July.
- Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September.
- van Dijk, Theon, 1996. "Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 151-67, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:38:y:2005:i:2:p:520-545. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.