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Menu-pricing and Quality Decisions of a Platform Monopolist

Author

Listed:
  • Tetsuya Shinkai

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Naoshi Doi

    (Otaru University of Commerce- Economics)

Abstract

This article examines menu-pricing and quality decisions of a platform monopolist for two types of sellers and buyers on a two-sided market. Under the GPD (general Pareto distribution) valuation of buyers for transaction services, we show that unique optimal services fees exist for sellers and buyers. The two types of services (premium and spot) are offered to both sellers and buyers. An optimal premium membership fee and the quality service level are considered for the premium type of buyers in a platform optimization problem. Assuming that the unit cost of the product is fixed, we show that the optimal membership fee/the level of quality service for premium-type buyers decreases/increases as the service cost for premium-type sellers increases. However, if delivery fees charged by transport companies for spot-type sellers increase, the optimal membership fee/level of quality service increases/decreases. However, if the demand for services of the platform for both types of buyers increases, both the optimal membership fee and quality level of services increase.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuya Shinkai & Naoshi Doi, 2023. "Menu-pricing and Quality Decisions of a Platform Monopolist," Discussion Paper Series 252, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:252
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Platform monopoly; Menu-pricing; Quality decisions; Two-sided market.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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