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The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Miller

    () (CESS, Nuffield College, Oxford, Great Britain)

  • Heiko Rauhut

    () (ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

  • Fabian Winter

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)

Abstract

Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation, this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of norms can be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the finally emerging norm. The theory is tested with a dynamical experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality, effort or efficiency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normative conflict is measured by the number of rejected offers in a recursive bargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated that more normative cues cause more normative conflict. Further, under the structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, the convergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and several equally reasonable norms co-exist. The findings are discussed with respect to the integration of sociological conflict theory with the bargaining concept in economic theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Miller & Heiko Rauhut & Fabian Winter, 2011. "The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-018
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    File URL: http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2011_018.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Hudson, 1996. "Trends in Multi-authored Papers in Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 153-158, Summer.
    2. Alexander W. Cappelen & Astri Drange Hole & Erik Ø Sørensen & Bertil Tungodden, 2007. "The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 818-827, June.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Katrin Schmelz, 2010. "E-nstructions: Using Electronic Instructions in Laboratory Experiments," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-047, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    5. Heiko Rauhut & Fabian Winter, 2009. "A sociological perspective on measuring social norms by means of strategy method experiments," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-054, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    6. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    7. Glenn Harrison & E. Rutström, 2009. "Expected utility theory and prospect theory: one wedding and a decent funeral," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 133-158, June.
    8. Anna Conte & Peter Moffatt, 2014. "The econometric modelling of social preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(1), pages 119-145, January.
    9. Fabian Winter & Heiko Rauhut & Dirk Helbing, 2009. "How norms can generate conflict," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-087, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions
      by maximorossi in NEP-LTV blog on 2011-04-11 20:16:07

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2016. "Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 144-165.
    2. Fabian Winter, 2013. "Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific cooperation norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-016, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social norms; normative conflict; bargaining; cooperation; experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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