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Destructor Game

Author

Listed:
  • Esther Kessler

    () (University College London, Behavioural & Brain Sciences Unit)

  • Maria Ruiz-Martos

    () (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I)

  • David Skuse

    () (University College London, Behavioural & Brain Sciences Unit)

Abstract

Destructive behavior has mostly been investigated by games in which all players have the option to simultaneously destroy (burn) their partners' money. In the destructor game, players are randomly paired and assigned the roles of destructor versus passive player. The destructor player chooses to destroy or not to destroy a share of his passive partner's earnings. The passive partner cannot retaliate. In addition, a random event (nature) destroys a percentage of some passive subject's earnings. From the destructor player's view, destruction is benefit-less, costless, hidden and unilateral. Unilateral destruction diminishes with respect to bilateral destruction studies, but it does not vanish: 15% of the subjects choose to destroy. This result suggests that, at least for some, destruction is intrinsically pleasurable.

Suggested Citation

  • Esther Kessler & Maria Ruiz-Martos & David Skuse, 2012. "Destructor Game," Working Papers 2012/11, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  • Handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/11
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    File URL: http://www.doctreballeco.uji.es/wpficheros/kessler_etal_2012.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abbink, Klaus & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2009. "The pleasure of being nasty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 306-308, December.
    2. Jeremy Clark, 2002. "House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 223-231, December.
    3. repec:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Matthijs van Veelen, 2009. "Reference point effects in antisocial preferences," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-03, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    5. Bosman, Ronald & Sutter, Matthias & van Winden, Frans, 2005. "The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 407-429, June.
    6. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2003. "Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 263-266, November.
    7. Daniel J. Zizzo & Andrew J. Oswald, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Pure Evil
      by Robin Hanson in Overcoming Bias on 2012-06-14 19:15:41

    More about this item

    Keywords

    anti-social behaviour; nastiness; money-burning;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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