The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
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- Bo Cowgill & Amanda Agan & Laura K. Gee, 2024. "The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(5), pages 1571-1588, September.
- Bo Cowgill & Amanda Y. Agan & Laura K. Gee, 2024. "The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income," CESifo Working Paper Series 11168, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
salary history bans; inequality; compensation; hiring; organizations; information economics; voluntary disclosure; statistical discrimination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GEN-2024-07-15 (Gender)
- NEP-LMA-2024-07-15 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages)
- NEP-LTV-2024-07-15 (Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty)
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