Governing the Networks of the Information Society. Prospects and limits of policy in a complex technical system
This paper examines the prospects and limits of policies towards information and communications technologies (ICTs). The co-evolution of technological, economic, and political factors that has affected the information network infrastructure during the past three decades has transformed it from a relatively closed to more open system. As a consequence, the degree of complexity of the ICT infrastructure has increased with far-reaching implications for its governance. Paradoxically, policy was better able to control important performance characteristics, such as prices or investment levels, during the past monopoly era. However, the ability to control came at the high price of the inefficiencies associated with monopoly organization. In the present more competitive framework, many feasible policy instruments only work indirectly. Sector performance is an emergent property resulting from decentralized decisions in markets. It is influenced but not fully determined by policy choices. These changes need to be recognized more explicitly in the theoretical foundations, the formation and the implementation of policy. Applying concepts from the theory of complex evolving systems, the paper develops lessons for the design of effective information and communications policy.
|Date of creation:||15 Nov 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Strohgasse 45, 5, A-1030 Wien|
Fax: 0043-1-710 98 83
Web page: http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226702766 is not listed on IDEAS
- Olivier Boylaud & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2001.
"Regulation, market structure and performance in telecommunications,"
OECD Economic Studies,
OECD Publishing, vol. 2001(1), pages 99-142.
- Olivier Boylaud & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2000. "Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunications," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 237, OECD Publishing.
- Ros, Agustin J, 1999. "Does Ownership or Competition Matter? The Effects of Telecommunications Reform on Network Expansion and Efficiency," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 65-92, January.
- R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, June.
- David Colander, 2003.
"The Complexity Revolution and the Future of Economics,"
Middlebury College Working Paper Series
0319, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- D. Colander., 2009. "The Complexity Revolution and the Future of Economics," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 1.
- Gutierrez, Luis H., 2003.
"Regulatory governance in the Latin American telecommunications sector,"
Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 225-240, December.
- Luis Gutierrez, 2002. "Regulatory governance in the latinamerican telecommunications sector," BORRADORES DE INVESTIGACIÓN 003447, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
- Denzau, Arthur T & North, Douglass C, 1994.
"Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31.
- Shy,Oz, 2001.
"The Economics of Network Industries,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521805001, june. pag.
- Warren J. Samuels, 0. "Economics, Governance and Law," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2570, April.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1998. " Limits to Institutional Reforms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 335-57, March.
- Wallsten, Scott J, 2001. "An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin America," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 1-19, March.
- Gutierrez, Luis H. & Berg, Sanford, 2000. "Telecommunications liberalization and regulatory governance: lessons from Latin America," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(10-11), pages 865-884, November.
- Ragin, Charles C., 2000. "Fuzzy-Set Social Science," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226702773, April.
- J. Barkley Rosser, 1999. "On the Complexities of Complex Economic Dynamics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 169-192, Fall.
- Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ita:itaman:04_03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Werner Kabelka)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.