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Libre Competencia y Autorización a Concesionarios Locales para Operar en Larga Distancia

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  • Ernesto R Fontaine
  • Salvador Valdés

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto R Fontaine & Salvador Valdés, "undated". "Libre Competencia y Autorización a Concesionarios Locales para Operar en Larga Distancia," Documentos de Trabajo 127, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:127
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    File URL: https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt-127.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard J. Gilbert & Richard G. Harris, 1984. "Competition with Lumpy Investment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 197-212, Summer.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    3. Salvador Valdés, 1987. "Negociación Vertical y Subinversión," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 24(72), pages 225-242.
    4. Luis Oscar Herrera & Fernando Coloma, 1990. "Análisis Institucional y Económico del Sector de Telecomunicaciones en Chile," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 27(82), pages 429-472.
    5. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    6. repec:bla:econom:v:46:y:1979:i:182:p:149-58 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
    8. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
    9. Perry, Martin K, 1978. "Vertical Integration: The Monopsony Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 561-570, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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