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Customs reforms in eastern Congo (DRC): Between norms and practices

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  • Kambale Mirembe, Omer

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain how importers, clearance agents and customs officers respond to ongoing customs administration reforms in the DRC. Customs reforms include computerization, single desk system and pre-shipment inspection. The DRC case reveals that the reforms as norms are indeed implemented, but they have not eradicated some ‘mispractices’. Actors involved adapt their practices within the framework of the reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Kambale Mirembe, Omer, 2013. "Customs reforms in eastern Congo (DRC): Between norms and practices," IOB Working Papers 2013.04, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    • Handle: RePEc:iob:wpaper:2013004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Congo; DRC; Kivu; customs;
    All these keywords.

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