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Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity

Author

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  • Alexander Sebald
  • Markus Walzl

Abstract

s demonstrated in a recent laboratory experiment [see Sebald and Walzl (2014)], individuals tend to sanction others who subjectively evaluate their performance when-ever this assessment falls short of the individuals' self-evaluation. Interestingly, this is the case even if the individuals' earnings are unaffected by the subjective performance appraisal. Hence, performance feedback which falls short of agents' self-evaluations can be interpreted as an unkind act that triggers a negatively reciprocal response not only if the assessment determines agents' earnings but also when it lacks monetary consequences. We propose a principal-agent model formalizing that agents might engage into conflict in response to ego-threatening performance appraisals and show that these conflicts stabilize principal-agent relationships based on subjective performance evaluations. In particular, we identify conditions for a positive welfare effect of increasing costs of conflict and a negative welfare effect of more capable agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl, 2012. "Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity," Working Papers 2012-16, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, revised Nov 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
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    7. Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl, 2014. "Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(2), pages 570-590, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Livio, Luca & De Chiara, Alessandro, 2019. "Friends or foes? Optimal incentives for reciprocal agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 245-278.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contracts; Subjective Evaluations; Self-Esteem; Ego-Threats; Reciprocity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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