Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Luca Livio, 2018. "Friends or Foes? Optimal Incentives for Reciprocal Agents," Working Papers ECARES 2018-03, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
More about this item
KeywordsContracts; Subjective Evaluations; Self-Esteem; Ego-Threats; Reciprocity;
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2012-09-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-03 (Microeconomics)
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