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Reserve price effects in auctions: estimates from multiple RD designs

Author

Listed:
  • Syngjoo Choi

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies)

  • Lars Nesheim

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)

  • Imran Rasul

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)

Abstract

We present evidence from 260,000 online auctions of second-hand cars to identify the impact of public reserve prices on auction outcomes. To establish causality, we exploit multiple discontinuities in the relationship between reserve prices and vehicle characteristics to present RD estimates of reserve price effects on auction outcomes. Our first set of results show that, in line with the robust predictions of auction theory, an increase in reserve price decreases the number of bidders, increases the likelihood the object remains unsold, and increases expected revenue conditional on sale. Reserve price effects are found to be larger when there are more entrants, and when the reserve price is lower to begin with. Our second set of results then combine these estimates to calibrate the reserve price effect on the auctioneer's expected revenue. This reveals the auctioneer's reserve price policy to be locally optimal. Our final set of results provide novel evidence on reserve price effects on the composition of bidders. We find that an increase in reserve price: (i) decreases the number of potential bidders as identified through individual web browsing histories; (ii) leads to only more experienced and historically successful bidders still entering the auction; (iii) the characteristics of actual winners are less sensitive to the reserve price than those of the average bidder, suggesting auction winners are not the marginal entrant.

Suggested Citation

  • Syngjoo Choi & Lars Nesheim & Imran Rasul, 2010. "Reserve price effects in auctions: estimates from multiple RD designs," CeMMAP working papers CWP30/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ifs:cemmap:30/10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
    2. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2013. "Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Prices in E nglish Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 202-242, March.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L62 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment; Related Parts and Equipment

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