The Farrell and Shapiro condition revisited
The purpose of this paper is to study the consequences of using the Farrell and Shapiro (1990) sufficient condition for merger approval to sectors in which a downstream horizontal merger may also affect upstream firms. As will be shown below, in some circumstances the sign of the relevant external effect can no longer be established by considering the merger as a sequence of in finitesimal mergers, each corresponding to a marginal change in output.
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- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
Economics Working Papers
8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- F. H. Hahn, 1962. "The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 329-331.
- Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-430, March.
- Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
- Barros, Pedro Luis Pita, 1997. "Approval Rules for Sequential Horizontal Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1764, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- al-Nowaihi, A. & Levine, P. L., 1985. "The stability of the cournot oligopoly model: A reassessment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 307-321, August.
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