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Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities

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  • Cremer, Helmuth
  • De Donder, Philippe

Abstract

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non-contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.

Suggested Citation

  • Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe, 2014. "Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities," IDEI Working Papers 827, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:28246
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    generosity; redistributiveness; pay-as-you-go pensions; collective annuity; longevity; Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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