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Voting on pensions: sex and marriage

Author

Listed:
  • LEROUX, Marie-Louise
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre
  • RACIONERO, Maria

Abstract

Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of derived pension rights.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RACIONERO, Maria, 2011. "Voting on pensions: sex and marriage," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2308, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2308
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001
    Note: In : European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), 281-296, 2011
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsuo Ono, 2016. "Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 99-124, February.
    2. Jante Parlevliet, 2017. "What drives public acceptance of reforms? Longitudinal evidence from a Dutch pension reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 1-23, October.
    3. M.L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2014. "Social Security and Family Support," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 115-143, February.
    4. Neugart, Michael & Kemmerling, Achim, 2015. "The emergence of redistributive pensions in the developing world," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112884, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Linda Cohen & Amihai Glazer, 2017. "Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 1399-1413, December.
    6. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-26-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Apr 2012.
    7. M.-L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2012. "The political economy of derived pension rights," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(5), pages 753-776, October.
    8. Cetin, Sefane & Hindriks, Jean, 2023. "Sustainability of pension reforms: An EU-wide political stress," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2023016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2014. "Old-age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 282-315, September.
    10. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2014. "Pension and the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 8479, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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