IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvrp/2308.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Voting on pensions: sex and marriage

Author

Listed:
  • LEROUX, Marie-Louise
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre
  • RACIONERO, Maria

Abstract

Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of derived pension rights.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RACIONERO, Maria, 2011. "Voting on pensions: sex and marriage," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2308, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2308
    Note: In : European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), 281-296, 2011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2002. "Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System," NBER Chapters,in: The Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform, pages 11-48 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Coronado Julia Lynn & Fullerton Don & Glass Thomas, 2011. "The Progressivity of Social Security," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-45, November.
    3. Rainald Borck, 2007. "On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 711-725, August.
    4. Marie-Louise Leroux, 2010. "The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 151-170, February.
    5. M.-L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2012. "The political economy of derived pension rights," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(5), pages 753-776, October.
    6. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. " The Political Economy of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 503-522, June.
    7. Carole Bonnet & Marco Geraci, 2009. "Comment corriger les inégalités de retraite entre hommes et femmes ? L’expérience de cinq pays européens," Population et Sociétés 453, Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED).
    8. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
    9. Grégory de Walque, 2005. "Voting on Pensions: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 181-209, April.
    10. Jongkyun Choi, 2006. "The Role of Derived Rights for Old-age Income Security of Women," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 43, OECD Publishing.
    11. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
    12. Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Social Security and Retirement around the World," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number grub99-1, August.
    13. Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Introduction to "Social Security and Retirement around the World"," NBER Chapters,in: Social Security and Retirement around the World, pages 1-35 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Pencavel, John, 1998. "Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 326-329, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tetsuo Ono, 2016. "Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 99-124, February.
    2. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0447-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. M.L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2014. "Social Security and Family Support," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 115-143, February.
    4. repec:kap:reveho:v:15:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11150-015-9317-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Old-age Social Security vs. Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-26-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Apr 2012.
    6. M.-L. Leroux & P. Pestieau, 2012. "The political economy of derived pension rights," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(5), pages 753-776, October.
    7. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2014. "Old-age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 282-315, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.