Reputation as an Entry Barrier in the Credit Rating Industry
We study competition between an incumbent Credit Rating Agency (CRA) and a sequence of entrant CRAs that are potentially more e¤ective but whose ability in appraising default risk is unproven when they enter the market. We show that free entry competition fails to select the most competent CRA as long as two conditions are met. First, investors and issuers trust the incumbent CRA to provide a sincere, although imperfect, assessment. Second, CRAs cannot charge higher fees for low rating than for high rating. Then, a rather incompetent CRA can dominate the market without concerns about entry. We derive policy implications.
|Date of creation:||10 May 2011|
|Date of revision:||25 May 2012|
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- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Peyrache, Eloïc & Quesada, Lucía, 2005.
"The Ownership of Ratings,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2013.
"Ratings quality over the business cycle,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 62-78.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Levich, Richard & Majoni, Giovanni, 2002. "Ratings, rating agencies and the global financial system: Summary and policy implications," MPRA Paper 13249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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